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GROWING PROFITABLE OR GROWING FROM PROFITS: 
PUTTING THE HORSE IN FRONT OF THE CART? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Firm growth is almost universally portrayed as a good thing, and is commonly used as a measure 
of success. Applying resource-based reasoning, we argue that growth is often not a sign of sound 
development. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms which grow without first securing high 
levels of profitability tend to be less successful compared to firms that first secure high 
profitability at low growth.  Empirical tests using two large, longitudinal data sets confirm that 
the profitable low growth firms are both more likely to reach the desirable state of high growth 
and high profitability and have a decreased risk of ending up performing poorly on both 
performance dimensions. The results suggest that academics, managers, investors and policy-
makers may benefit by adopting a more nuanced view of firm growth that explicitly incorporates 
its intricate relationship with profitability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Few things could be easier than expanding a business if that were your only objective. All 
one would have to do would be to buy or produce the business’s products or services at going 
market rates and sell them for significantly less. With the exception of a few, special cases, 
demand would soar and the firm would experience tremendous growth in sales volume. 
However, the growth would obviously not reflect effective value creation and appropriation by 
the firm, and it would hence be neither profitable nor sustainable.  
Despite this obvious fact, researchers, practitioners and policy-makers alike have tended 
to place a great deal of emphasis on firm growth per se as an indication of business success. 
While it is clear that in some circumstances growth is a valid indication of success, in this paper 
we question just how often this is really the case for small and medium firms. Of course, the 
notion that growth can be harmful is clearly old news (Ramezani Soenen, & Jung, 2002:65; 
Markman & Gartner, 2002). However, adverse growth is treated as a relatively rare exception, 
not a common concern of firms. In business media around the world, top lists and praise of the 
economy’s fastest growing firms are ubiquitous (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005), as are policy programs 
designed to stimulate and assist the growth of individual firms, presumably in the hope that this 
will result in increasing employment and tax revenue on the societal level (Storey, 1994, 2000). 
Teaching cases and textbooks devote much space to the problem of how to achieve expansion for 
the firm (e.g., Hisrich, Peters, & Shepherd, 2005; Wickham, 2004; Winn, 2004). Further, 
academics frequently use firm growth uncritically as an operationalization of business success; a 
practice that is particularly pronounced in entrepreneurship research (see Appendix 1). Some 
researchers go so far as to make growth “the very essence of entrepreneurship” (Sexton & 
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Smilor, 1997:97) or include growth more or less as part of the definition of entrepreneurship 
(Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990:21, 25). 
Davidsson, Delmar and Wiklund (2002) argue that venture growth is an important topic 
for entrepreneurship research regardless of whether one employs Gartner’s (1988) organization 
creation perspective or Shane and Venkataraman’s (2000) view that entrepreneurship consists of 
the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities. We agree. However, we also agree 
with Alvarez & Barney (2004) that value creation (they use the term “rent generation”) and 
appropriation are the central tasks of entrepreneurial firms. Importantly, as we emphasized with 
our opening recipe for high growth, growth is not direct evidence of effective value creation and 
appropriation. Rather, profitability provides the best evidence of value appropriation. It is 
therefore an important task for entrepreneurship research to investigate the relationship between 
growth, on the one hand, and the creation and appropriation of value on the other.  
Through the theoretical lens of the Resource-Based View (RBV) (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984) we argue in this article that sound growth usually starts with achieving 
sufficient levels of profitability, i.e., that profitability (and the underlying competitive advantage 
it reflects) is the “horse” that should pull the growth “cart” rather than the other way round. 
Consequently, we also argue that firms that embark on a growth trajectory starting from low 
levels of profitability usually do not achieve high profitability as a result of their growth. Instead, 
as their growth is unlikely to be sustainable (Ramezani, et al., 2002) we argue they are likely to 
become low performers on both dimensions. We test these hypotheses using two longitudinal 
data sets of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) from Sweden and Australia. 
Numerous studies have empirically explored the correlation between growth and 
profitability as well as the serial correlations of each of these measures over time (Capon, Farley, 
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& Hoenig, 1990; Coad, 2006). What we contribute is a theory-driven configuration view of the 
interrelationship between profitability and growth. Based on RBV reasoning, we argue the 
appropriateness of growth is contingent on the current level of profitability (and the underlying 
reason for that profitability). What we also contribute is the empirically tested suggestion that 
detrimental effects of growth are the rule rather than the exception when growth starts from a 
situation of below average profitability. Importantly, while we use RBV logic to develop our 
hypotheses and interpret our results regarding profit-growth configurations over time this study 
does not include direct measures of the firms’ resources. Consequently, we do not regard our 
study a test of or contribution to resource-based theory (Arend, 2006). 
In the following section we will briefly examine the traditional theoretical arguments 
outlining why firms should become more profitable as a result of their growth, but then review 
the relevant empirical literature to demonstrate there is a lack of support for the notion that it is 
common for firm growth to lead to profitability. We then develop our RBV-based case for 
focusing on profitability before going for growth, which leads to two hypotheses that we test 
empirically. Analyzing growth-profit configurations over time is technically challenging. In the 
Method section we describe our novel yet straightforward approach to that problem, as well as 
presenting our samples and measures. After presenting our results we discuss their implications 
for business and policy practice. We also address the limitations of our study and some ideas for 
future research.  
 
DOES GROWTH MAKE FIRMS PROFITABLE? 
The assumption that volume growth is positively associated with profitability – and hence 
with growth in the value of the firm – is supported by theoretical arguments about scale 
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economies (Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2004; Gupta, 1981;), experience effects (Amit, 1986; 
Stern & Stalk, 1998), first mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) and network 
externalities, the latter denoting the special case when the value of a product or service to a 
consumer increases in proportion to the number of users (Katz & Shapiro, 1985).  That is, these 
theories suggest growth will drive profitability either through the lowering of costs or by 
establishing a strong market position. However, although growth no doubt might increase 
survivability (Geroski, 1995; Phillips & Kirchhoff, 1989)  by reducing the liabilities of smallness 
and newness (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) of the very youngest and smallest actors in the market, 
there is actually little support for a strong and general growth-profit relationship beyond that. For 
example, research in industrial economics have shown that scale economies are not much of a 
barrier to entry; that surviving new entrants operate for long times at sizes far smaller than the 
industry average; that minimum efficient scale is typically reached at a rather small size; that very 
limited cost advantages are typically gained beyond that minimum, and even that it is possible to 
operate significantly below it without severe cost disadvantage (Geroski, 1995; Hill, 1988; 
Siegfried & Evans, 1994). 
Furthermore, a number of studies have reported correlations between growth and profit 
measures, either as focal research question or a side issue. Their results range from somewhat 
substantive positive correlations (Cox, Camp & Ensley, 2002; Chandler & Jansen, 1992; 
Mendelson, 2000) to those that are weakly positive yet statistically significant (Baum & Wally, 
2003; Cho & Pucic, 2005; Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004; Peng, 2004); to those finding no 
statistically or practically significant relationship (Roper, 1999; Sexton, Pricer, & Nenide, 2000; 
both based on very sizable samples) and those with a significant negative relationship (Markman 
& Gartner, 2002; Reid, 1995). 
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 The most comprehensive, albeit somewhat dated, assessment of the issue is a meta-
analysis by Capon et al. (1990:1148). At first glance their results seem to support a positive 
growth-profit relationship. However, a closer examination discloses that a significant positive 
association between growth and financial performance is found in across-industry studies only. 
In within-industry studies, the effect is minuscule in magnitude and statistically non-significant 
(Capon et al., 1990:1154; Table 5). Thus, the results do not establish that firms that grow more 
than their direct competitors consequently become more profitable. Rather, the findings suggest 
that firms in growing industries benefit from the higher growth- and profit rates of their 
industries; a theme well-known also from Product Life Cycle theory (Day, 1981).  
 In summary, the empirical evidence on the relationship between firm growth and 
profitability is inconclusive. That is, despite the various theoretical arguments there is little 
evidence of a substantial, universal tendency for firms to become more profitable as a result of 
their growth. This indicates that although the two dimensions of performance sometimes move 
together as suggested by theories mentioned above, there are frequent other instances when the 
growth-profit relationship is neutral or negative.  
 
THE RESOURCE-BASED VIEW AND PROFITABLE GROWTH 
Although growth is not usually an explicitly highlighted topic in contemporary RBV 
studies (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001) the perspective is in its historical origin very closely 
connected to the core topic of our study, profitable growth. Penrose (1959) obviously focused 
her entire study on growth. An important assumption underlying her analysis was that managers 
aimed exclusively for profitable growth prospects (Penrose, 1995:ix). Based on this rationalistic 
assumption, she could conveniently treat profit and growth as equivalent investment goals 
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(Penrose, 1959:30). Similarly, Wernerfelt’s (1984) seminal paper explicitly addresses the 
profitability of different routes to growth. Hence, it is with considerable justification that Kor and 
Mahoney (2004:190) claim that profitable growth is one of the “cornerstones of a resource-based 
view of strategic management.” 
According to RBV, superior firm performance – e.g., above average profitability – is 
based on competitive advantage, which Barney (1991:102) defines as “implementing a value 
creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitors.” 
If these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of the said strategy the advantage is also 
sustained (or a sustainable competitive advantage – SCA – which seems to be the preferred 
terms in more recent works). In this original formulation, Barney (1991) presents the familiar 
argument that the sustainability of the advantage is contingent on the extent to which the firm’s 
resources or resource bundles are valuable, rare, hard-to-copy and non-substitutable (VRHN). In 
a later, equally well-known reformulation the sought for resource qualities are specified as 
valuable, rare, inimitable, and organized (VRIO) (Barney, 1997). The “O” in the latter 
formulation can be regarded an increased emphasis on having an effective business model in 
place – including an effective revenue model – thus ascertaining both value creation and value 
appropriation by the focal firm (Alvarez & Barney, 2004; Amit & Zott, 2001).  
By the logic of RBV, firms should pursue growth opportunities that match their resource 
advantages; if they go for other opportunities growth may destroy rather than create value (Kogut 
& Zander, 1992). If they refrain from growth opportunities that match their resources they may 
enjoy high levels of profitability based on a sub-optimally small volume of business, thus failing 
to maximize value creation and -appropriation. Hence, from the perspective of RBV firms should 
strive to maximize profitable growth. 
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When firms have resource advantages concerning their current product offerings this is 
likely to be reflected in above average profitability. Unless the market potential for the current 
products is already exhausted such firms are likely to be able to grow through market penetration 
while retaining their high level of profitability. In addition, the available resources may also offer 
an advantage concerning other products, leaving potential for profitable growth via the launch of 
new products or services. Apart from their current profitability here being assumed to reflect 
current resource advantages, the profitability of these firms creates an advantage in itself with 
respect to profitable growth compared with firms that are not able to base their expansion on 
retained earnings to the same extent (Marris, 1967; Scott & Pascoe, 1986). That is, firms that 
have achieved above average profitability are likely to be able to reach the desirable state of 
profitable growth. 
Let us now consider the notion of firms attempting to “grow profitable”. The RBV does 
not deny the possible existence of cost advantages based on scale. However, if scale does 
provide a competitive advantage, a firm commencing from a position without those scale 
advantages would be at a competitive disadvantage and in a competitive setting unable to 
develop such advantages through growth per se. Moreover, if based on scale per se a cost 
advantage is unlikely to be sustainable by Barney’s (1991; 1997) criteria. Neither does RBV 
deny the possibility of first-mover advantages based on entry or mobility barriers. However, it is 
emphasized that such barriers “only become sources of sustained competitive advantage when 
firm resources are not homogeneously distributed across competing firms and when these 
resources are not perfectly mobile” (Barney, 1991:105; cf. Wernerfelt, 1984:173). 
For firms exhibiting growth at low levels of profitability, RBV logic is more consistent 
with the notion of “misguided growth” rather than firms trying to “grow to become profitable”. 
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Realistically, in a random sample of SMEs only a minority will have significant, resource-based 
competitive advantages. Most firms are imitative businesses without much inherent growth 
potential (Aldrich, 1999). Consequently, most firms never embark on a significant growth 
trajectory, and rightfully so (Davidsson, Achtenhagen & Naldi, 2006). Moreover, SME managers 
may well be intendedly rational and, as owners, not subject to agency problems that may gear 
employed managers towards sub-optimal expansion projects. Nonetheless, for reasons of 
incompetence, over-optimism, or perhaps the misconception that growth will automatically 
generate cost advantages (cf. above), some of them are likely to pursue growth opportunities for 
which their firms have no particular competitive advantage.  
From the perspective of RBV the occurrence of growth at low levels of profitability 
would indicate such instances. The inadequate level of profitability indicates that the firm has not 
yet established a resource advantage that can be the basis for profitable expansion of sales of 
current products. Hence, growth would require price cuts or costly marketing efforts to win over 
customers facing several equally appealing offerings. Alternatively, the firm has a value-creating 
advantage but fails to back it up with a revenue model that appropriates enough of the value it 
creates. A third possibility is that the low profitability that accompanies the growth indicates that 
the firm expands into new areas that do not match its resources. Finally, as we have noted above, 
the volume growth per se is unlikely to make the firm significantly more profitable. For these 
reasons, we argue that firms that embark on growth starting from low levels of profitability are 
unlikely to reach the desirable state of profitable growth. 
Based on these RBV arguments, we hold that in most situations it is advantageous to let 
profitability (and the competitive advantage it reflects) be the horse that pulls the growth cart, 
rather than the other way around.  To re-iterate, we propose that the combination of high 
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profitability and high growth – the state arguably most indicative of realizing value 
maximization (Cho & Pucic, 2005) – is more likely to be reached by firms that first achieve 
sufficient levels of profitability and then strive for growth, compared with firms that embark on a 
growth trajectory without first showing high profitability. The latter firms, we argue, have not 
yet achieved a resource-based advantage and therefore not shown an ability to produce a market 
offering that customers deem has value considerably above its cost of production. Further, there 
is no guarantee that aggressive volume expansion would solve that problem. This suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms that show high profitability at low growth are more likely to reach a state of high 
growth and high profitability in subsequent periods than are firms that first show high 
growth at low profitability.  
 
Although support for H1 would support our contention that the strategy to try to “grow 
profitable” is often a dubious practice, it would not provide conclusive evidence that such is the 
case. For example, a firm may first grow at low profitability and then remain stable but highly 
profitable at this larger size. This would arguably be a sign of better over all performance (more 
value creation) compared with a firm continuing to show high profitability year after year 
without ever expanding. Therefore, if H1 is supported additional evidence is needed concerning 
what happens to the firms that do not achieve simultaneous high growth and high profitability. A 
result showing that attempts to go for growth starting from low profitability often backfires and 
instead puts the firm among those that show below average performance on both outcome 
dimensions would provide stronger evidence of the possible harmfulness of going for growth 
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without first ensuring sufficient profitability. Our resource-based lens suggests growth at low 
levels of profitability reflects lack of resource-based advantage. Hence, such growth would not 
be sustainable, and not solve the firm’s profitability problem. There is no corresponding reason 
to suspect that current high profitability would somehow hamper future profitability or growth. 
Consequently: 
 
H2: Firms that show high growth at low profitability are more likely to reach a state of low 
growth and low profitability in subsequent periods than are firms that first show high 
profitability at low growth. 
 
METHOD 
Data Sources 
We use two separate data sources to examine our research questions. The data were 
originally collected by government statistical agencies in Australia and Sweden, over different 
four year periods. Both data sets contain a random sample of SMEs across many industries, 
though they stratify the population differently resulting in substantially different size 
distributions. In particular, the Australian sample contains a much larger number of firms in the 
smallest size class. 
The Australian data is sourced from the Business Longitudinal Survey (BLS) conducted 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) over the period 1995 to 19981.  The sampling frame 
was all businesses on the ABS business register employing fewer than 200 employees, excluding 
primary industries other than mining, government enterprises, utilities and public services 
                                                 
1 Refers to financial years ending in July of nominated year. 
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(education, health, libraries, museums, parks etc.). The survey was designed to provide 
information on the growth and performance of Australian employing businesses and to identify 
selected economic and structural characteristics of these firms.  A panel of 5,031 businesses was 
established in the 1994-95 financial year. Each subsequent year, the panel consists of those 
businesses remaining alive, supplemented by a sample of new businesses added to the ABS 
business register in that year. Completed responses were collected from between 84% and 90% 
of the panel for the surveys in 1995-96 to 1997-98.  We use all cases that have complete data in 
any two subsequent years, or have complete data in the first year and cease business during the 
second. As a result, our analysis is based on a total of 5,031 businesses with between 3,488 and 
3,717 businesses being included in any one analysis. 
The Swedish data originates from a longitudinal survey study undertaken in the years 
1997-2000. The sample was drawn from Statistics Sweden’s complete records of legal business 
enterprises in Sweden. The sampling frame was all private limited liability companies with 10-
250 employees, excluding agriculture, forestry and fishing as well as government enterprises, 
utilities and public services. The sampling frame was stratified as follows: two size groups of 10-
49 and 50-250 employees; four industry sectors of manufacturing, retail/wholesale, professional 
services and other services; and the three corporate governance categories independent firms; 
member of company group of less than 250 employees, and member of company group larger 
than 250 employees. From each of the 24 stratifications 110 firms were randomly selected, 
except where the sub-population was less than that number, resulting in a sample of 2,455 firms.  
Rather than representing items from the survey, the growth and profitability data we use 
are likewise data from Statistics Sweden’s records. These data were originally collected as part 
of the statutory reporting required of businesses in Sweden, and were appended to the survey 
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data set. Growth and profitability data was requested from Statistics Sweden only for firms that 
participated in at least the first survey round and for whom phone contact information could be 
obtained in 2000. This reduces the sample to 1917 cases. Missing data on growth and/or 
profitability in Statistics Sweden’s files in addition to eliminating firms that merged or 
reorganized as part of a parent company further reduced the analyzable sample for this study to 
1,482 firms. As a result, our analysis of Swedish firms uses information from a total of 1,482 
businesses with a minimum of 1,470 businesses being included in any one analysis. 
Measures 
Sales growth was preferred over employment growth based on emerging consensus in the 
literature that for most purposes sales is the more relevant growth indicator (Davidsson & 
Wiklund, 2000; Delmar, 1997; Hoy, McDougall, & Dsouza, 1992; Weinzimmer, Nystrom, & 
Freeman, 1998). The specific formula used was the change in sales from the previous year as a 
percentage of the sales in the previous year. For the Australian data, sales data for two years 
prior to the first survey year were reported. Hence sales growth could be calculated in the first 
year (1995). For the Swedish data only current year sales are reported. Hence, growth can only 
be calculated from the second year (1998). 
We used accounting measures of rates of return as our measure of profitability. Slightly 
different measures were used due to data availability. For the Australian data, we used the 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR), calculated as the net profit (operating profit or loss before tax and 
extraordinary items) as a percentage of total assets in each year. For the Swedish data, we used 
the closest available alternative, which is the after tax Return on Assets (ROA). For the testing of 
our hypotheses, both the before tax (IRR) or after tax (ROA) measure of profitability are 
suitable. 
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Analysis 
Our research is concerned with the dual growth-profit performance of firms over time. 
While the analysis problem entails aspects reminiscent of lagged- and interaction effects in 
regression analysis (e.g., Cowling, 2004), this approach is not appropriate for our problem of 
predicting a multivariate outcome. Instead, we adopt a simple, intuitively appealing schema that 
allows us to follow a firm’s trajectory in a two-dimensional growth-profit performance space. 
We classify firms into five performance groups in any time period as shown in Figure 1. Firms 
are first separated into a 4x4 classification based on the two performance dimensions; sales 
growth and profitability. Specifically, firms are classified into quartiles for both sales growth and 
profitability relative to other firms in their industry. They were then divided into the following 
five performance groups2: 
• Poor: low performance on both dimensions (final state for hypothesis H2) 
• Middle: mid performance on both dimensions (included to reduce the risk that miniscule 
movements have a large effect on results). 
• Growth: high growth performance, but low profit performance (initial state presumed to 
lead to poorer outcomes for H1 and H2) 
• Profit: high profit performance, but low growth performance (initial state presumed to 
lead to better outcomes in hypotheses H1 and H2) 
• Star: high performance on both dimensions (final state for hypothesis H1) 
Insert FIGURE 1 about here 
 
                                                 
2 In preliminary work, we also used several other methods of categorising firms to ensure our results were not an 
artefact of the categorisation schema. For example, we categorised firms into four groups (no middle category), each 
group representing a quarter of Figure 1. We also repeated the analysis for quartiles defined over the entire 
population, rather than relative to industry. For each categorisation schema, the substantive results presented in the 
paper were supported. These additional analyses are available from the first author on request. 
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Our hypotheses are concerned with how firms move in this growth-profit performance 
space over time. In particular, we are interested in comparing Growth to Star transitions with 
transitions from Profit to Star (H1). We are also interested in comparing Growth to Poor with 
Profit to Poor (H2). Similar to Markov chain analysis used in population dynamics we use state 
transition matrices as the starting point of our analysis. That is, for each performance group in 
one year, we calculate the proportion that moved to each group (or ceased business). Our interest 
is testing the differences between specific transition proportions (specified above), which we do 
using standard z-tests.  In the analyses we will also include transitions to “Exit” as a separate 
category. This is an ambiguous category including not only financial failures but also voluntary 
closures and lucrative outright sales of firms to new owners (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, & Woo, 
1997; Headd, 2003). Consequently Exit should not be merged with the Poor category or be 
interpreted as a pure failure category. Also, this category is not directly comparable for Australia 
and Sweden as many of the Swedish exiting firms are not included in the available sample3. In 
addition to the separate analyses of the Australian and Swedish samples we will also examine the 
robustness of our findings by sub-categories based on industry, firm size, and firm age within 
each country. Further, apart from the direct tests of our hypotheses we will also comment on 
other results where they have some bearing on our overall argument about the effects of 
performance configurations over time. 
Length of Time Period 
In line with convention, we perform our growth and profit calculations based on annual 
data. The theory on which our hypotheses are based does not suggest the ideal time period for 
                                                 
3 Differences are due to several factors. The Swedish sample does not include firms with less than ten employees 
(the size category most likely to exit). Further, the richer survey data allowed firms who continued trading but 
changed registration number (and would otherwise have been considered to have exited) to be included and those 
who have not exited but trading abnormally (in process of liquidation, merger or reorganization) to be excluded. 
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which the transitions should be tested. Hence, we test our hypotheses over both a short time 
horizon (1-year transitions) and longest time horizon permitted by out data (three-year two-year 
transitions for Australia and Sweden respectively). For the 1-year transitions, we aggregate data 
for all the 1-year transitions provided by the data (three 1-year transitions for Australia and two 
for Sweden). Admittedly, there is a risk that this is too short a period if there is a strong tendency 
for “investments in growth” to lower concurrent profitability while paying off in the long run. 
However, the survey-based part of the Swedish study contains some data that can address the 
same issues over longer time periods, both as regards the time period over which the initial and 
end states are assessed, and the spacing between them. We will comment further on how these 
data compare with our main analysis in the Limitations part of the Discussion section.   
RESULTS 
Analysis of Entire Samples 
The full, aggregated 1-year transition matrices as well a complete transition matrix over 
the longest available period in each country, are reported in Tables A1a to A1d in Appendix II. 
These tables show that although a tendency to remain in one’s category of origin is a major 
source of deviation from randomness, there are also many other deviations from statistical 
expectation in the tables that are of a large absolute magnitude. In what category a particular firm 
is found in a particular year is clearly not random. On the contrary, the results indicate strong 
path dependence. As should be expected, this dependence is stronger for shorter-term transitions.  
The transitions relating to our hypotheses are summarized in Table 1. The left half of this 
table provides very strong support for the hypothesis that Profit is more likely than Growth to 
transition to Star (H1). In the 1-year transitions the Profit firms are two to three times more 
likely to end up in the Star category. Although the tendency is even stronger in the 2-year 
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transition based on Swedish data, the size of the category differences diminishes for the longer 
transitions in the Australian results. However, the difference is still substantial – an “over 
representation” by 62% (16.5/10.2) – and statistically significant in the three-year Australian 
analysis.  
______________________________ 
Insert table 1 about here! 
_______________________________ 
 
Strong support is also provided, in the right hand side of the table, that firms in the Profit 
category are less likely than those originally being Growth firms to transition to Poor (H2). This 
result comes through relatively stronger in the Australian case, where Growth firms are two to 
three times more likely to end up among the firms that perform below average on both 
dimensions. Although not as strong, the difference is substantial and statistically significant also 
in the Swedish data, with a minimum “over representation” of 37% (26.1/19.0) for Growth firms 
making this transition, relative to firms originating in the Profit category. Thus, both hypotheses 
get strong support in the full sample analysis for both countries.  
Analysis of Sub Samples 
Tables 2a and 2b report the subgroup analyses that we perform in order to explore the 
robustness of our findings with variation in industry, firm size and firm age. When interpreting 
these tables, we note that these tests involve smaller sample sizes, and consequently lower power 
of the statistical tests. The average cell sizes for the aggregated 1-year transitions are 84 and 24 
for the Australian and Swedish samples respectively, and only 30 and 12 respectively for the 
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multi-year transitions4. Hence, differences of the same magnitude as reported for the full samples 
will not be associated with the same levels of statistical significance.  
______________________________ 
Insert tables 2a and 2b about here! 
_______________________________ 
Table 2a demonstrates that H1 is supported across all sub-categories tested. Out of the 52 
contrasts that could be made, 51 are in the expected direction and 41 are statistically significant 
(at p = 0.05 or better). The support is somewhat weak for the Retail industry, where the only 
reverse difference is found (for Australia in the three-year analysis) and where the Swedish 
results include Wholesale businesses as well. Similarly, Table 2b indicates that H2 holds up 
across sub-samples. Out of 52 contrasts, 51 are again in the expected direction and 30 reach 
statistical significance (at p = 0.05 or better). While the Retail industry also here achieves only 
one statistically significant result out of four the reason seems to be lacking power; the estimated 
magnitude of the percentage difference is substantial in all four analyses. The one result that runs 
in the opposite direction concerns 1-year transitions for the 2-5 year old firms in the Swedish 
data and appears to be an idiosyncratic occurrence. There is no obvious, general pattern across 
firm age groups.    
We conclude that, within the boundaries of our empirical investigations, the effects 
hypothesized in both H1 and H2 appear to be robust. Across a range of industries, firm sizes and 
firm ages, firms that first achieve above average profitability at low growth (Profit) are more 
likely to achieve the desirable state of high growth/high profitability (Star) than are firms that 
first go for above average growth at low levels of profitability (Growth). Conversely, the latter 
                                                 
4 Sample size of entire sample / 5 sub-groups / 25 cells (5x5 transition matrix). 1-year results aggregate multiple 
years to increase sample of transitions. 
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category of firm is more likely than the former to transition to the low growth/low profitability 
category (Poor).  
 
Additional Observations 
 Beyond the strict testing of hypotheses the results in Table 1 can also be read as showing 
that Growth firms are two to three times more likely to transition to Poor than to Star. We note 
that if our results were entirely driven by costly “investments in growth” that will eventually pay 
off, we would expect to see this ratio to diminish for longer transitions. Our results do not show 
any tendency in this direction. A further inspection of tables A1a-d also reveals that no other 
category is as likely as the Growth firms to end up in the Poor group, apart from the firms that 
were already in the latter category. Conversely, no other group is as likely as the Profit firms to 
end up as Stars, except those that were Stars already in the first period. These tables also reveal 
that not only the Profit firms, but also those in the Middle category “outperform” the Growth 
firms in every analysis as judged by a higher frequency of transitions to Star and a lower 
frequency of transitions to Poor. Although not reported here, in most cases these results would 
also be statistically significant if tested as hypotheses. 
All in all, these additional observations suggest a quite strong superiority for 
“profitability first” over “growth first” as a strategy to achieve high overall firm performance. 
This conclusion would be moderated if there were a strong tendency for Growth firms to 
transition to Profit. Such transitions would indicate that the firm now enjoys above average 
profits based on a larger volume of business, consistent with goals of maximizing value creation 
and -appropriation. However, tables A1a-d show that such transitions are unusual and about 
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equally likely for firms originating in the Poor or Middle categories. Hence, there is no support 
for the idea of “growing profitable” in these data. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest that high profit, low growth firms are more likely to become high 
profit, high growth firms compared with firms that start from a position of high growth and low 
profits. Firms that grow at low levels of profits are not very likely to achieve high profitability as 
a result of their expansion. Instead, these firms are considerably more likely to transition to what 
we have called the “Poor” category, i.e., the sub-sample of firms that is below average on both 
growth and profitability (and in the lowest quartile for at least one of these). That is, our results 
suggest that for small and medium-sized firms, attempting to “grow profitable” is a dubious 
strategy that often backfires.  
We argue that these results are consistent with an RBV-based interpretation. Before 
going for significant growth, firms need to develop some kind of competitive advantage based on 
an identification and exploitation of the uniqueness of their resource bundles. Alternatively, they 
need to build such a resource-based advantage in the first place. The fact that a firm achieves 
above average profits for its industry is a sign that an advantage of this kind has been identified, 
and that it is backed up by an effective revenue model that ascertains the firm appropriates a fair 
share of the value it creates. In addition, the high level profitability creates a direct resource 
advantage in terms of the cost of financing growth. How sustainable these advantages are will 
vary from case to case and is something we can say little about on the basis of this research. We 
can say, however, that those firms that pursue above average growth without first attaining 
  
22
22
satisfactory levels of profitability are unlikely to much improve their profitability position merely 
as a result of their growth. 
These results have important implications for business practitioners, policy makers, and 
academics. Before detailing these implications, we caution the reader about some of the 
limitations of our research.  
Limitations  
Like all research studies, this study has some limitations that should be mentioned. One 
important limitation is that the resource-based mechanism underlying the configurative profit-
growth relationships that we have uncovered has largely been assumed rather that assessed in a 
more direct manner. Hence, our study does not constitute a strong test of resource-based theory 
(Arend, 2006). Although this limitation does not affect our hypothesis tests or their implications 
in terms of firm profitability and growth, it is relevant whenever we use RBV reasoning to 
interpret these findings as there may be other feasible theoretical explanations for our results. For 
example, the literatures on stages-of-development and growth transition (e.g., Arbaugh & Camp, 
2000; Flamholtz & Randle, 1990; Hambrick & Crozier, 1985) points out a number of problems 
that growth creates, which could explain why many firms fail to maintain their above-average 
growth rate, or improve their profitability as a result of growth. However, other than the 
possibility that ‘Growth’ firms would run faster into financial difficulties these models do not 
provide much of an explanation for the marked differences that we observed between this 
category and ‘Profit’ firms in regards of attaining a state of profitable growth.  
Consistent with Wernerfelt’s (1984) notion that products and resources are two sides of 
the same coin we have argued that the superior market offerings that render firms high 
profitability are resource-based. Others may argue this notion is tautological and prefer other – or 
  
23
23
better falsifiable – theoretical explanations for above-average profitability (Priem & Butler, 
2001). However, we would argue that regardless of the precise theoretical interpretation our 
results raise valid concerns against SMEs in general seeking growth when starting from a weak 
profitability position.  
Arguably, the most important empirical limitation of our study is that the data do not 
allow us to test longer term effects. However, we could demonstrate that our main results were 
not restricted to year-by-year transitions. To provide further confidence in our results over longer 
time periods we conducted supplementary analyses not reported above. The Swedish data also 
contained self report measures of both net profitability and sales growth relative to other firms in 
their industry over the last three years, reported in both 1997 and 2000. These were reported on a 
five point scale: much worse, worse, equal, better and much better. These data allow us to 
perform similar analyses referring to an initial profit-growth configuration calculated over three 
years as related to a subsequent profit-growth configuration calculated over the following, non-
overlapping three-year period. These analyses also support our hypotheses (H1 and H2). The 
result of this supplementary analysis provides us with confidence that our findings are upheld 
when performance over a longer time horizon is considered. Further, this additional analysis 
demonstrates that the most important aspects of our results hold up for both self-report and 
accounting based performance measures. 
The scope of our empirical examination is restricted to small and medium sized firms and 
to two relatively small (in population), economically advanced countries in the late 1990s. 
Although we can see no obvious, theoretical reason why these relationships would be 
substantially different in other contexts, a couple of observations are worth noting. First, the 
frequency of venture capital backed growth is likely to be higher in, e.g., the US, and the size of 
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the home market is much larger there. Only empirical investigation can reveal whether this leads 
to different results concerning our hypotheses. Second, it may be speculated that in “transition 
economies” (Jackson, Klich, & Poznanska, 1999; Peng & Heath, 1996) the rapid development 
may provide stronger reasons to try to “grow profitable,” aiming at future harvest, than is the 
case in the economies we have studied. To the best of our knowledge, the time periods studied in 
the respective countries were not characterized by any extreme conditions in terms of business 
cycle or otherwise. 
Although our sub-sample analyses did not suggest any systematic differences in the 
results by firm age, firm size, or industry it is, of course, conceivable that for more narrowly 
defined sub-groups it would be a sound, long term strategy to maximize growth (based on patient 
external funding) and solve the profitability problem at a later point in time. We will return to 
this issue below when we discuss implications for external investors.  
Our lack of information concerning why firms exit, taken together with the uneven 
proportion of firms transitioning to the “Exit” category, is a further limitation. If a higher than 
average proportion of the exits from the Growth category in fact represents profitable transfer of 
ownership it would weaken the implications of our results. On the other hand, if – in line with 
our suspicion based on the category’s high frequency of transition to the Poor category – a 
higher than average proportion of their exits  represent true failure, it would further strengthen 
the implications of our findings. The low occurrence of exits in the Swedish data suggests our 
main findings cannot be an artifact of the indeterminacy of this category.  
Finally, we have different time periods, sample composition, and operationalisations for 
our Australian and Swedish data sets, respectively. Had the results been markedly different in the 
two empirical contexts, this would have posed a problem for interpreting these results. However, 
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given the consistency of our results, this robustness across variations in the research design 
strengthens the generalizability of our findings (cf. Reynolds, Storey & Westhead, 1994:103).  
Implications 
Implications for academics. The implications for academics span theorizing, research 
design and teaching. For positive theory the primary implication is that it is descriptively wrong 
to portray SME growth as “success”. The exceptions are too frequent to accept this proposition 
even as an approximation. Normative theory, in its turn, should be more precise in specifying 
how and under which conditions (what type of) firm growth contributes to more terminal 
outcomes like company value (or stakeholder utility), either directly or via increased profits. We 
have suggested a resource-based explanation for high profit firms becoming high profit and high 
growth firms, while low-profit, high growth firms neither sustain their growth nor attain high  
profitability as a result of it. Research designed to provide a more direct test of these underlying, 
resource-based mechanisms would be highly valuable. Further, growth and profitability are 
logically not symmetric components for building company value. Although high profitability at 
low growth may be sub-optimal it is difficult to see how high profitability could be value-
destroying and hence detrimental to the true goals of the stakeholders of a business organization. 
Above-average growth, on the other hand, certainly can be value-destroying when it entails the 
expansion of loss-generating activities. In this way, our findings are consistent with the work of 
Cho & Pucic (2005) who found that while both profitability and growth contribute to company 
value, the direct effect of profitability on company value was four to five times stronger than the 
corresponding effect of growth. Furthermore, about half the total effect of growth on value was 
contingent on a positive effect of growth on profitability. That is, the “pure” effect of growth on 
company value was weak whereas the authors characterize the effect of profitability as 
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“extremely strong” (p. 569). Similarly, Ramezani et al. (2002:65) conclude that “Our empirical 
results indicate that maximizing growth does not maximize corporate profitability or shareholder 
value.” These logical and empirical arguments suggest that normative theory should not portray 
growth and profitability as equally important and mutually compensating aspects of firm 
performance.  
For research design our results strongly imply caution with the use and interpretation of 
growth as a measure of firm performance. When available, indicators reflecting more directly the 
true goals of the relevant stakeholders should be used. When it is reasonable to assume that 
company value is a better representation of the true goal but no direct measures of it can be 
obtained, including both growth and profitability is sounder than using just one of them. 
However, our results caution against combining indicators of growth and profit in one index. Our 
results clearly suggest profit and growth are not compensatory, and that “high profitability/low 
growth” is, on average, clearly superior to “high growth/low profitability”.  Examining growth 
and profitability as separate outcome dimensions (Baum & Wally, 2003) appears to be a sounder 
practice, allowing more detailed insights and flexibility in interpretation. When non-availability 
of data forces a heavy reliance on growth as performance indicator, increasing the time period 
over which it is assessed could be a step in the right direction, as unsound growth is less likely to 
be sustained. Finally, the implications of our results for academics in their role as educators are 
that they should show more respect for owner-managers’ reluctance to grow and accept external 
financing (cf. below) and be less eager to advocate a growth ideology without suitable qualifiers.    
Implications for entrepreneurs and SME managers. Empirical studies have identified that 
the majority of entrepreneurs or small firm owner-managers are reluctant to grow their 
businesses, especially if growth requires external equity funding (Sapienza et al., 2003;  
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Wiklund, Davidsson & Delmar, 2003). Our results suggest they may be well advised to focus on 
profit first, and not blindly embrace growth as ideology. This said, it is important to realize we 
are not suggesting that SME (owner-)managers in general should become even more cautious 
about growth or about benefiting from the financial and other resources external investors can 
provide. We have already noted that empirical evidence implies that, as a collective, they already 
refrain from pursuing many growth opportunities likely to be consistent with their own goals. 
Instead, what we do suggest is that rather than being very eager to expand, SME (owner-
)managers should be eager to build and identify the uniqueness of their resource endowments 
and translate them into product/market offerings that enable them to generate sufficient profits. 
When they have proven an above-average ability to create and appropriate value in the small 
scale they have the basis for attaining sound, profitable growth that will be easier to manage and 
less of a threat to the long term well-being of the firm and its owners.  
We acknowledge that for some firms the situation may be that growth is necessary in 
order to become profitable. As noted earlier, there is reason to think this is more often true for 
the very smallest and youngest firms and for particular industry niches. However, we strongly 
caution entrepreneurs not to simply assume this is true. Moreover, we believe it is sounder 
practice for those managers who believe growth is necessary to become profitable, to develop 
precise ideas concerning how growth can enhance profitability of their particular firm, rather 
than relying on a belief that growth more or less automatically improves profitability. 
Implications for external investors. We must start here with the caveat that although a 
large share of the firms in our sample are likely to rely to some extent on external loan capital, 
samples representative of the entire population of SMEs – such as those used in this study – are 
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not representative of the category of firm venture capitalists typically deal with. The portfolio 
firms of VCs are a much more select category.  
This said, for any type of external investor our results imply that high growth, when 
starting from a low profitability situation, is a warning signal rather than an unambiguous sign of 
positive development. External investors’ provision of resources may, consistent with resource-
based reasoning, help the firm develop a resource-based advantage on which profitable growth 
can be based. This appears to be a sound logic for investment. However, an alternative logic of 
external investors is to push for growth per se to generate large revenues and maximize the early 
return on their investment. However, if the firm is not particularly profitable to start with it does 
not generally seem to be the case that this changes just because the firm gets bigger. There is 
even the risk that the low profitability state is reinforced by the external funding, as the funded 
entrepreneur(s) learn to expect the money they need to develop their ideas from the capital 
market and not from surplus from customers. That is, an unsound business culture may be 
established in the firm. Agency problems and costs of growth may further contribute to eroding 
profitability. Finally, a range of psychological processes such as groupthink (Choi & Kim, 1999) 
and reliance on social proof (Cialdini, 1988) may also have detrimental effects on profitability as 
more parties get involved in the management of the growing firm.  
Premature pushing for growth by external investors as (a partial) explanation for our 
results is admittedly speculative, as we have not analyzed any data on external funding and other 
external pressures towards growth of the analyzed firms. However, when investing in firms that 
are not yet particularly profitable it would seem the investor has to take on the much more 
difficult task of contributing to the fundamentals of a future, resource-based advantage. The 
financial and general management resources that investors habitually provide are neither rare nor 
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hard to copy, so they do not in themselves constitute the type of resources on which — according 
to RBV — sustained, profitable growth can be built.   
Having said this for SMEs in general, we cannot assume our results necessarily apply to 
the select group of high-potential firms that VCs invest in. First-mover-advantage (FMA) 
reasoning suggests radical innovators who create entirely new markets play under different rules 
to the average SMEs. However, the lack of proof that size leads to eventual profitability is 
something that has concerned the very researchers who coined the FMA concept: “We see little 
to be gained from more studies demonstrating first-mover advantages based on market share. 
Empirical tests should increasingly be related to profit performance” (Lieberman & 
Montgomery, 1998:1122). Similarly, in the specific context of disruptive innovation, Christensen 
and Raynor (2003) have argued forcefully for patience for growth but impatience for profit, a 
notion directly in line with our “profits first” arguments and findings for SMEs more generally. 
Their argument is that the market is initially small for disruptive technologies and strongly 
pursuing early volume growth into the main market, for which the firm has not yet developed an 
attractive enough offer, is likely to be counter productive. In combination with our results, this 
provides sound reason for external investors to put more emphasis on establishing profitability as 
well as a profit-seeking (rather than funding-seeking) culture within their portfolio of firms, and 
having more patience for the growth that can eventually realize the full value of opportunities 
developed and pursued by these firms.  
 Implications for policy-makers. Our results also have important implications for policy-
makers. In the hope to increase employment and tax revenue it has been relatively popular to 
launch policy incentives, e.g. subsidized training programs, grant schemes and finance, intended 
to encourage small firms to grow. There are at least two problems with such an approach. First, 
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growth as such is rarely a goal for the owner-manager and the incentives may not be enough for 
them to overcome their reluctance to accept the perceived adverse effects of growth (Sapienza et 
al., 2003; Wiklund et al., 2003),. Second, there is not much use in expanding unprofitable 
business operations. If the firms pursue growth as a result of the incentives, the growth may not 
be profitable and consequently the increase in size may be non-sustainable.  
Although growth may be perceived as a dilemma by the entrepreneur, likely to lead to 
positive as well as negative consequences, there are few business owner-managers who see much 
problem in the firm becoming more profitable. Therefore, rather than urging firms to grow in 
order to solve the policy makers’ problem, policies should arguably be geared toward helping 
firms achieving their own goals of being profitable. By the RBV logic we have employed, this is 
not achieved directly by growth but by identifying, building and exploiting resource-based 
competitive advantages. Our results demonstrate that firms that show above-average profits often 
become growing firms that still enjoy above-average profits. Therefore, if policies can help more 
firms become highly profitable – an objective aligned with the small firm owner-managers’ own 
goals – the problem of growth will take care of itself.  
CONCLUSION 
Growth is often portrayed as evidence of business success. Our findings are a strong 
reason for practitioners and researchers alike to question a universal and uncritical growth 
ideology. Our results show that firms in the desirable state of high growth/high profitability are 
much more likely to originate from profitable firms with low growth than from growing firms 
with low profitability. Firms in the latter category are instead likely to retreat to a low 
growth/low profitability state. Hence, seeing profit as the horse that pulls the growth cart seems 
in most cases to be a sounder worldview than the opposite. Obviously, not all will be prepared to 
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accept this conclusion based on the theoretical rationales and empirical evidence we have 
provided. We see our results as an invitation and hopefully an inspiration for other researchers to 
verify or challenge them, and to provide additional input into how they should be interpreted. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH: IS THERE 
A PRO-GROWTH BIAS? 
 
In order to assess the use of growth as performance indicator in entrepreneurship and 
management research we have examined data from the following sources. First, we performed a 
scholar.google.com based analysis of title words such as performance growth, expansion, profit, 
profit(ability), value and success in articles published in the last ten years in outlets identified by 
Fried (2003) as “appropriate outlets for entrepreneurship research”, focusing on the top ranked 
broader management journals in his analysis (AMR; AMJ; SMJ; ASQ; OSC; MSC; all “level 1”) 
and the top five niche journals (JBV; ETP; SBE; ERD; JSBM; levels 1-3). Second, we 
investigated more closely what performance indicators were used in articles published in the last 
three years in Fried’s top niche journal (JBV) and his top two empirical mainstream journals 
(AMJ and SMJ). Third, we searched the ICE part of the Julia database, which is a special 
collection covering all kinds of publications in entrepreneurship and small business, at 
www.hj.se/ice. These investigations of performance criteria do not aspire to be complete but we 
hold that they suffice for giving an accurate account of the main tendencies we discuss below.
 There is little doubt that entrepreneurship researchers show much more interest in growth 
than in profitability, and often interpret the former as “success”. Our searches of the ICE part of 
the Julia database shows that in entrepreneurship research, “growth” as title word is about ten 
times as common as “profit”, “profitable” and “profitability” combined. The combination 
“success” and “growth” is about six times more common than “success” combined with either 
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“profit” or “profitability”, whether title word or free text (abstract) is used.  Although value 
creation or similar terms are frequently included in definitions or delineations of 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Gartner, 1990; Morris, Lewis, & Sexton, 1994) they are almost never 
included as an explicit, operationalized variable, the exception being research on initial public 
offerings (cf. Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya 2003); presumably for data availability 
reasons. Sometimes growth and profitability are used jointly in entrepreneurship research (e.g., 
Wiklund, 1999), showing at least implicit understanding that it is profitable growth that creates 
value.  
This greater interest in growth in entrepreneurship and small business research is not 
totally without justification. Young and small firms may have a greater need for growth in order 
to achieve legitimacy and survival (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Davidsson, 1991; Storey, 1994). 
Further, reliable data on their financial performance can be impossible to collect from small 
firms and may be irrelevant for very young ones (Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Chandler & 
Hanks, 1993; Van de Ven, Hudson, & Schroeder, 1984).  
 However, there is obviously more to the strong interest in growth in entrepreneurship 
research than data availability. Gartner (1990) showed that growth was one out of eight themes 
that professional users commonly associate with the entrepreneurship concept. Stevenson and 
Jarillo (1990:21, 25) argued that “Entrepreneurship is the function through which [firm] growth 
is achieved” and described entrepreneurial behavior as “the quest for [firm] growth through 
innovation.” Sexton & Smilor (1997:97) explicitly stated that “Growth is the very essence of 
entrepreneurship”. Arguably, such assertions build on an assumption that growth reflects value 
creation.  
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 The preoccupation with growth is no doubt greater in entrepreneurship research than in 
strategy and general management research. A search on scholar.google.com for “all in title” in 
Fried’s (2003) top five entrepreneurship specialty journal reveals that the ratios for “growth or 
expansion” to “performance” as title words is 0.91, compared with 0.16 for the top six 
mainstream management journals.  Using the same journals the ratio of “profit(ability)” to 
“growth or expansion” is 0.08 in entrepreneurship and 0.38 in mainstream management research 
outlets. The mainstream strategy and management literatures usually refer to the conceptual 
dependent variable as “performance”, which is usually assessed through indicators of 
profitability only (see e.g., Goerzen & Beamish, 2005 for a review as well as an example). When 
included, growth is usually investigated alongside profitability measures, either separately (e.g.,. 
Baum & Wally, 2003; Cho & Pucic, 2005; DeSarbo, Benedetto, Song, & Sinha, 2005; Florin, 
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2003; Kim et al., 2004; Peng, 2004) or combined in an index (e.g., Garg, 
Walters, & Priem, 2003; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).  
In summary, growth is often used as sole or main indicator of “success” in 
entrepreneurship research; more so than in management research in general. Given the weak and 
inconsistent relationship between growth and profitability (see main text) this suggests an overly 
uncritical view on growth prevails in entrepreneurship and SME research. 
APPENDIX 2 
 
TABLE A1a 
Combined 1 Year Transition Percentages – Australia 
   Initial (Year X) Performance Group 
  
Poor a 
(n=2057) 
Middle a, b 
(n=2964) 
Growth a 
(n=1588) 
Profit a  
(n=1499) 
Star a 
(n=2379) 
TOTAL 
(n=10469) 
Exit 9.1 4.2 6.4 7.8 4.6 5.1 
Poor 30.8 17.9 30.3 11.0 12.9 19.7 
Middle 21.4 45.9 22.8 19.7 19.8 29.1 
Growth 21.2 9.5 22.6 5.6 6.2 12.9 
Profit 6.0 8.8 6.2 26.3 25.4 14.5 
Final 
(Year X+1) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 11.5 13.6 11.6 29.6 31.1 18.7 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Table report percentage of specified (initial state) performance group that transitions to specified (final state) performance group. 
The three one-year transitions (1995-1996, 1996-1997 and 1997-1998) are aggregated. Percentage signs are removed for readability. 
Transitions related to the hypotheses are in bold font.  
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TABLE A1b 
Combined 1-Year Transition Percentages – Sweden 
   Initial (Year X) Performance Group 
  
Poor a 
(n=590) 
Middle a, b 
(n=846) 
Growth a 
(n=434) 
Profit a, b 
(n=407) 
Star a 
(n=675) 
TOTAL 
(n=2952) 
Exit 2.4 0.1 0.5 2.2 0.4 2.0 
Poor 35.4 16.0 28.3 17.7 11.0 21.5 
Middle 23.2 45.5 18.7 19.7 22.4 28.1 
Growth 21.9 9.8 30.9 3.7 6.4 13.2 
Profit 6.3 11.2 6.2 27.0 18.5 12.3 
Final 
(Year X+1) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 10.8 17.4 15.4 29.7 41.3 22.9 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Table report percentage of specified (initial state) performance group that transitions to specified (final state) performance group. 
The two one-year transitions (1998-1999 and 1999-2000) are aggregated. Percentage signs are removed for readability. Transitions 
related to the hypotheses are in bold font.  
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TABLE A1c 
1995 to 1998 Transition Percentages: Australia 
   Initial (1995) Performance Group  
  
Poor a 
(n=619) 
Middle a, b 
(n=930) 
Growth a 
(n=605) 
Profit a 
(n=486) 
Star a 
(n=848) 
TOTAL 
(n=3488) 
Exit 31.5 17.2 26.3 28.4 20.5 23.7 
Poor 21.6 14.8 23.1 12.1 12.7 16.6 
Middle 20.4 37.4 18.8 15.6 19.0 23.7 
Growth 11.5 8.9 15.0 3.9 9.0 9.7 
Profit 5.8 10.6 6.4 23.5 15.7 12.1 
Final 
(1998) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 9.2 11.0 10.2 16.5 23.1 14.2 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Table report percentage of specified 1995 (initial state) performance group that transitions to specified 1998 (final state) performance 
group. Percentage signs are removed for readability. Transitions related to the hypotheses are in bold font.  
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TABLE A1d 
1998 to 2000 Transition Percentages: Sweden 
   Initial (1998) Performance Group  
  
Poor a 
(n=295) 
Middle a, b 
(n=429) 
Growth a 
(n=226) 
Profit a 
(n=195) 
Star a 
(n=337) 
TOTAL 
(n=1482) 
Exit 3.7 0.7 1.8 3.6 1.2 2.0 
Poor 33.6 20.0 26.1 19.0 11.0 21.5 
Middle 22.7 42.2 24.3 19.5 22.6 28.1 
Growth 21.0 7.5 24.8 7.2 9.5 13.2 
Profit 8.1 10.5 11.5 17.9 15.4 12.3 
Final 
(2000) 
Performance 
Group 
Star 10.8 19.1 11.5 32.8 40.4 22.9 
 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Table report percentage of specified 1998 (initial state) performance group that transitions to specified 2000 (final state) performance 
group. Percentage signs are removed for readability. Transitions related to the hypotheses are in bold font.  
 
TABLE 1 
Hypothesis Tests for Whole Sample 
 Final Performance Group 
Star 
 
Poor 
 
 Initial Performance Group 
Growth a 
 
(H1) 
Profit a,b 
 
Growth a 
 
(H2) 
Profit a,b 
 
1 Year Transitionsc 11.6 *** 29.6 30.3 *** 11.0 
Australia 
3 Year Transitiond 10.2 ** 16.5 23.1 *** 12.1 
1 Year Transitionse 15.4 *** 29.7 28.3 *** 17.7 
Sweden 
2 Year Transitionf 11.5 *** 32.8 26.1 * 19.0 
 
a Tables reports percentage of specified initial performance group that transition to specified final performance group. Percentage signs 
are removed for readability. 
 b Significance levels: * p < 0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001. 
c Aggregate of three one-year transitions. d Aggregate of two one-year transitions. e 1995-1998 transition. f 1998-2000 transition.
TABLE 2a 
Sub Group Tests of Transitions to Star (H1) 
 Australia Sweden 
 1 Year Transitions Three Year Transition 1 Year Transitions Two Year Transition 
Initial Year Performance Group Initial Year Performance Group Initial Year Performance Group Initial Year Performance Group 
Sub Group 
Growtha  Profita,b Growtha  Profita,b Growtha  Profita,b Growtha  Profita,b 
Manufacturing 9.8 *** 25.2 10.7 n.s. 13.4 15.0 *** 41.1 8.3 *** 44.6 
Prop./Bus. Serv 10.6 *** 28.0 8.7 ** 22.6 13.7 ** 26.0 15.5 n.s. 25.8 
Retail c 11.7 ** 23.1 13.3 n.s. 9.8 13.5 n.s. 21.1 8.3 n.s. 23.3 
Wholesale 12.0 *** 23.8 8.0 * 17.2  N/A   N/A  
Other  11.7 *** 28.9 10.7 * 19.6 19.1 n.s. 28.0 11.9 ** 34.0 
Size 1d 14.6 *** 31.4 9.4 ** 19.6 13.0 * 26.0 5.7 ** 27.1 
Size 2d 14.0 *** 29.4 13.6 n.s. 11.9 18.4 * 30.0 16.7 ** 35.4 
Size 3d 11.3 *** 30.2 8.3 * 18.5 16.8 ** 30.3 13.7 ** 33.3 
Size 4d 8.9 *** 27.5 9.9 * 16.2 10.6 *** 34.6 4.3 *** 35.7 
< 2 years e 13.3 * 24.0 6.5 * 21.7  N/A   N/A  
2-5 years 9.2 *** 36.4 9.1 * 18.1 20.4 n.s. 26.8 14.8 n.s. 19.0 
5-10 years 13.8 *** 28.8 14.5 n.s. 17.1 16.7 ** 30.2 9.8 *** 35.7 
10-20 years 13.9 *** 28.7 6.8 ** 16.6 16.0 * 27.6 18.0 * 33.3 
> 20 Years 7.7 *** 30.1 11.5 n.s. 13.2 13.3 *** 31.6 8.1 *** 35.1 
a The tables reports percentage of specified initial performance group that transition to Star. Percentage signs are removed for readability. b Significance levels: * p < 
0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001. c Retail and Wholesale combined for Swedish sample. d Size classes for Australian sample based on revenue in Australian dollars: 
Size 1 <$300K; Size 2 $300K-$1M; Size 3 $1M-$3M; Size 4 >$3M. Size classes for Swedish sample based on revenue in Kronor: Size 1 <15M; Size 2 15M-$50M; 
Size 3 $50M-$150M; Size 4 >$150M. e The Swedish results are not reported as the sample included only 12 firms less than 2 years old.  
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TABLE 2b 
Sub Group Tests of Transitions to Poor (H2 )  
 Australia Sweden 
 1 Year Transitions Three Year Transition 1 Year Transitions Two Year Transition 
Initial Year Performance Group Initial Year Performance Group Initial Year Performance Group Initial Year Performance Group 
Sub Sample 
Growtha  Profita,b Growtha  Profita,b Growtha  Profita,b Growtha  Profita,b 
Manufacturing 26.8 *** 12.5 18.1 n.s. 12.4 35.3 *** 15.2 30.6 n.s. 21.4 
Prop./Bus. Serv 34.2 *** 10.4 32.0 ** 11.8 25.9 n.s. 20.6 25.4 n.s. 22.6 
Retail c 22.8 *** 7.1 20.0 n.s. 9.8 28.8 n.s. 16.9 20.8 n.s. 10.0 
Wholesale 24.0 *** 10.2 26.4 * 14.1  N/A   N/A  
Other  29.7 *** 12.1 25.0 ** 12.0 22.7 n.s. 17.2 23.7 n.s. 17.0 
Size 1d 27.9 *** 10.0 21.1 ** 10.1 31.2 n.s. 29.2 28.6 n.s. 25.0 
Size 2d 32.6 *** 11.1 28.8 *** 7.9 26.2 ** 12.9 25.0 n.s. 21.5 
Size 3d 29.8 *** 16.0 20.5 n.s. 15.2 28.2 * 17.6 24.7 * 11.1 
Size 4d 30.6 *** 8.8 22.5 n.s. 16.2 29.4 ** 9.6 28.3 n.s. 17.9 
< 2 yearse 26.0 ** 11.5 21.7 n.s. 13.0  N/A   N/A  
2-5 years 28.6 *** 9.1 24.5 ** 11.1 14.3 n.s. 19.5 29.6 * 9.5 
5-10 years 25.8 *** 12.3 18.6 n.s. 15.0 27.5 n.s. 23.6 23.0 n.s. 21.4 
10-20 years 33.9 *** 11.1 27.7 *** 11.0 37.2 ** 17.1 28.0 n.s. 20.5 
> 20 Years 32.7 *** 11.6 22.9 ** 10.4 27.1 *** 14.1 25.6 n.s. 19.5 
a The Table reports percentage of specified initial performance group that transition to Poor. Percentage signs are removed for readability. b Significance levels: * p < 
0.05;  ** p < 0.01;  *** p < 0.001. c Retail and Wholesale combined for Swedish sample. d Size classes for Australian sample based on revenue in Australian dollars: 
Size 1 <$300K; Size 2 $300K-$1M; Size 3 $1M-$3M; Size 4 >$3M. Size classes for Swedish sample based on revenue in Kronor: Size 1 <15M; Size 2 15M-$50M; 
Size 3 $50M-$150M; Size 4 >$150M. e The Swedish results are not reported as the sample included only 12 firms less than 2 years old.  
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FIGURE 1 
Categorization Schema of Firms by Growth and Profitability 
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